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The three-pronged community property agreement' is a
unique' combination of inter-vivos contract and statutory will
substitute.3 It permits spouses to agree on the status of prop-
erty currently held, the status of property acquired in the
future, and the disposition of community property upon the
death of either spouse. It is only the final element, the disposi-
tion of property at death, which is authorized and controlled
by statute.4 The inter-vivos elements are controlled by general
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1. Cross, The Community Property Law in Washington, 61 WAsH. L. REv. 13, 94
(1986). A three-pronged community property agreement contains terms that address
the status of property currently held, the status of property acquired in the future, and
the disposition of community property upon the death of either spouse. Agreements
that deal with fewer terms, while not considered three-pronged agreements, may still
be perfectly valid community property agreements.
2. In Reagh v. Dickey, 183 Wash. 564, 573, 48 P.2d 941, 945 (1935), the Washington
Supreme Court noted that the statute allowing husband and wife to contractually
provide for the disposition of community property at the death of either was unique
among all other states.
3. See Oltman and Reutlinger, The Statutory Community Property Agreement as
a Will Substitute on the Death of the Second Spouse, 19 GONZ. L. REv. 511 (1983/84);
see Cross, supra note 1, at 94, 101.
4. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.120 (1986) provides as follows:
Nothing contained in any of the provisions of this chapter or in any law of
this state, shall prevent the husband and wife from jointly entering into any
agreement concerning the status or disposition of the whole or any portion of
the community property, then owned by them or afterwards to be acquired, to
take effect upon the death of either. But such agreement may be made at any
time by the husband and wife by the execution of an instrument in writing
under their hands and seals, and to be witnessed, acknowledged and certified
in the same manner as deeds to real estate are required to be, under the laws
of the state, and the same may at any time thereafter be altered or amended
in the same manner. Provided, however, That such agreement shall not
derogate from the right of creditors, nor be construed to curtail the powers of
the superior court to set aside or cancel such agreement for fraud or under
some other recognized head of equity jurisdiction, at the suit of either party.
See also Oltman and Reutlinger, supra note 3, at 512.
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contract principles.5 It is common practice to combine the stat-
utorily authorized will substitute provision with the inter-vivos
contract provisions into one formal agreement.6
There are many combinations of inter-vivos and at-death
elements that spouses may choose. On the other hand, the
spouses may simply choose to have an at-death distribution
without agreeing on the status of property during their life-
times. The usual agreement contains a combination that
declares the status of currently held property (usually labeling
it community), agrees upon the status of future acquisitions
(usually that they will attain community status upon receipt),
and describes the distribution of community property upon the
death of either spouse (usually that the surviving spouse
receives all community property).7 Such an agreement will
cause all property owned or acquired by the spouses to be con-
verted to community property immediately upon acquisition
and distributed to the survivor upon death.
Since the statutory community property agreement is only
available under the statute to husband and wife, the statutory
element is by definition terminated upon dissolution. There-
fore, community property agreements seldom contain a term
dealing with dissolution. However, neither the statutes nor the
case law provides any guidance for spouses having a commu-
nity property agreement who, while not divorced, are perma-
nently separated and living "separate and apart"' in a defunct
marriage. The law should provide guidance in this situation;
community property agreements should terminate upon the
permanent separation of spouses. 9
This Article will assess the effect of living separate and
apart in a defunct marriage on the typical community property
agreement, including both inter-vivos and at-death elements.
First, as background, this Article will explain and analyze the
Washington law status of the concept of living separate and
apart. Second, this Article will then review the facts and the
5. See WASH. STATE BAR ASS'N, WASHINGTON COMMUNITY PROPERTY DESKBOOK
§ 5.10 (2d ed. 1989); Cross, supra note 1, at 102; Oltman and Reutlinger, supra note 3,
at 512.
6. See, e.g., In re Estate of Brown, 29 Wash. 2d 20, 185 P.2d 125 (1947). However, it
is not required that all provisions appear in every agreement.
7. WASHINGTON WILL AND TRUST MANuAL SERVICES, § XVII (1979); see Oltman
and Reutlinger, supra note 3.
8. For a discussion of living "separate and apart," see infra notes 10-19 and
accompanying text.
9. Cross, supra note 1, at 104.
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holding of In re Estate of Lyman,'0 an appeals court case illus-
trating the typical fact situation and setting forth the approach
of the Washington Supreme Court in this area. It remains the
best and most instructive example to date of this issue. Third,
the Article will discuss the general contract law concept of
implying an omitted contract term when it appears that policy
and efficiency dictate that such a term be implied. Fourth, the
Article will suggest implying a term of termination in commu-
nity property agreements upon permanent separation, analo-
gizing to the law of acquisitions while living separate and
apart. Finally, the Article explores the policy benefits of
implying such a term in community property agreements.
The treatment the law gives to property acquisitions by
spouses while living separate and apart provides the basic pol-
icy support for the implication of an omitted term in commu-
nity property agreements. Since that policy likely reflects
what most permanently separated spouses would want, it is
also likely to reflect the intent of most spouses with respect to
the validity of community property agreements during perma-
nent separation. Therefore, this Article concludes that a term
should be implied in each community property agreement ter-
minating such agreements upon a permanent separation.
I. HISTORICAL BASIs FOR THE CONCEPT OF LIVING SEPARATE
AND APART
The concept of living separate and apart has long been
part of the Washington statutory scheme, especially as it
relates to wives. Prior to 1972, Wash. Rev. Code § 26.16.140,
which was originally enacted in 1881, provided that the earn-
ings and accumulations of a wife while living separate from
her husband were her separate property." That statute recog-
nized that, while a technical "marital" status might still
remain, the "community relationship" upon which the commu-
nity property principles were based no longer existed.1 In
1948, the Washington Supreme Court extended this same con-
cept to husbands in Togliatti v. Robertson.3 The legislature
consolidated the treatment of husbands and wives in its 1972
10. 7 Wash. App. 945, 503 P.2d 1127 (1972), qff'd, 82 Wash. 2d 693, 512 P.2d 1093
(1973) (adopting opinion of Court of Appeals).
11. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.140 (1986).
12. See id.
13. 29 Wash. 2d 844, 852, 190 P.2d 575, 578-579 (1948).
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amendment to Wash. Rev. Code § 26.16.140. Since then, by
statute, the earnings and accumulations of either husband or
wife are separate property while living separate and apart.'
4
While the 1972 amendments clarified application of the
statute, the question remains whether the spouses are in fact
living separate and apart. Over the years, courts have given
the term "separate and apart" some meaning. Primarily, these
courts have attempted to define circumstances that will indi-
cate that the spouses have abandoned the community with no
fixed intent to reconcile.'"
In most cases that have found spouses to be living separate
and apart, the couple involved has either signed a separation
agreement,' 6 filed for dissolution,' 7 or obtained some form of
interlocutory decree.' While such technical indications of
intent are not necessary, it seems such indications may be the
easiest way of overcoming the presumption of an ongoing com-
munity.19 Finally, both spouses must accept and acknowledge
the termination of the community. One spouse cannot unilat-
erally destroy the community short of a dissolution. However,
once both spouses have accepted and acknowledged the termi-
nation of the community, only the technical marital status
remains.
While Washington courts have, to a certain extent, clari-
fied the status of living "separate and apart," the courts have
not analyzed the effect of this status on community property
agreements. Spouses having such an agreement but living sep-
arate and apart are left in a state of legal limbo. The commu-
nity is severed, but the community property agreement is
whole because the spouses are not yet divorced. Because the
14. WASH. REv. CODE § 26.16.140 (1986).
15. "[MKere physical separation of the parties does not establish that they are
living separate and apart sufficiently to negate the existence of a community." Oil
Heat Co. of Port Angeles v. Sweeney, 26 Wash. App. 351, 354, 613 P.2d 169, 171 (1980).
The case of Rustad v. Rustad, 61 Wash. 2d 176, 377 P.2d 414 (1963), exemplifies this
principle. In Ruatad, the husband was separated from his wife due to her confinement
in a mental institution. The court found there was no evidence they had abandoned
the community even though they had been separated for so many years. Id. at 180, 377
P.2d at 416. Hence, they were not living "separate and apart." Id.
16. In re Estate of Osicka, 1 Wash. App. 277, 461 P.2d 585 (1969).
17. MacKenzie v. Sellner, 58 Wash. 2d 101, 361 P.2d 165 (1961).
18. Togliatti v. Robertson, 29 Wash. 2d 844, 190 P.2d 575 (1948).
19. "When they have not yet chosen to institute dissolution proceedings, the
continued integrity of their marriage should be presumed except under the most
unusual circumstances." Aetna Life Insurance v. Boober, 56 Wash. App. 567, 572, 784
P.2d 186, 188 (1990).
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agreement retains life, even if the marriage does not, the
spouses are left unsure as to the true status of their property.
The court in In re Estate of Lyman failed to apply the law of
living separate and apart to community property agreements,
providing no guidance or solutions to separated spouses with
such agreements.
II. IN RE ESTATE OF LYMAN
A. Factual Background
The 1972 court of appeals case, In re Estate of Lyman,'
presents the situation described above. Ralph and Jannie
Lyman were married in 1959. In 1964 they executed an
"Agreement as to Status of Community Property" pursuant to
Wash. Rev. Code § 26.16.120.21 At the same time they executed
reciprocal wills which gave their respective estates to the sur-
viving spouse.22
Between 1964 and 1970, the parties separated twice and
were reunited. However, in 1970 the wife filed for divorce and
obtained a temporary restraining order followed by a tempo-
rary injunction enjoining the husband from "selling, assigning
or encumbering" any of the community property. There is no
indication in the opinion whether the Lymans were living sep-
arate and apart in a defunct marriage at this time or even
whether they were separated at all. One week after the wife
filed for divorce, the husband executed a new will giving one-
half of his community property to his stepsons (his wife's chil-
dren by a former marriage). This will, of course, was in direct
contradiction to the community property agreement which
apparently passed all community property to the surviving
wife. Three weeks after he executed the new will, the hus-
band died. The wife recorded the community property agree-
ment, and the stepson filed the will for probate. The trial
20. 7 Wash. App. 945, 503 P.2d 1127 (1972), aff'd, 82 Wash. 2d 693, 512 P.2d 1093
(1973) (adopting opinion of court of appeals).
21. rd. at 946, 503 P.2d at 1129. The Lyman court described this agreement as
being executed "under RCW 26.16.120." It did not, however, indicate whether this
agreement contained only the at-death element or whether it also contained provisions
for the characterization inter-vivos of existing and after-acquired property. However
the primary focus of the court's opinion is on the at-death element.
22. Id. It is not uncommon to execute wills concurrently with a community
property agreement. The execution of concurrent wills resolves problems that arise if
the agreement is revoked, if the surviving spouse dies without the opportunity of
executing a will, or if one of the spouses acquires property not covered by the terms of
the agreement.
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court admitted the will to probate, but found that the commu-
nity property agreement was valid and that it prevailed over
the will. Subsequently, the court dismissed the proceedings in
probate, and the stepson appealed.
On appeal the stepson argued that the parties had mutu-
ally abandoned the community property agreement when the
wife filed for divorce and when the husband executed the con-
tradictory will. The court noted that the community property
agreement was a "contract sui generis. "2 As with any con-
tract, it could be abandoned by mutually manifested intention,
but the inconsistent actions of one party would not be suffi-
cient to effect an abandonment. 24 However, it would be suffi-
cient if the inconsistent conduct by one party was acquiesced in
by the other party.25 By definition, "uncommunicated subjec-
tive mutual intention" is not enough.' In other words, it was
not sufficient that both parties independently wanted an aban-
donment of the agreement. Because the contract was bilateral,
the parties could not abandon it without a clear manifestation
of the intent to abandon by one party and then an acquiescence
or acceptance by the other party.27 The intention must be a
"manifested intention." According to the Lyman court, such
manifestation involves both foresight of the consequences and
a desire to do the things foreseen. 28 There was no evidence
that the wife foresaw or desired the abandonment of the com-
munity property agreement simply by her filing her complaint
for divorce.' Likewise, the execution by the husband of a con-
flicting will, while manifesting his intention, was not evidence
of abandonment without the knowledge and acquiescence of
the wife.
B. Analysis of Lyman
The court in Lyman focused solely on the issue of whether
23. Id. at 948, 503 P.2d at 1130. Sui generis, of course, means the only one of its
kind, peculiar or special. In many ways the community property agreement is special,
certainly unique in that it allows husband and wife to contractually agree to the
disposition of their property at death. On the other hand, as unique as it is, it is still a
contract and must be interpreted and analyzed in light of contract principles.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 948-49, 503 P.2d at 1130.
26. Id. at 949, 503 P.2d at 1131.
27. Id. at 948-49, 503 P.2d at 1130-31.
28. Id. at 949, 503 P.2d at 1131.
29. Id. at 949-50, 503 P.2d at 1131.
30. Id. at 951, 503 P.2d at 1132.
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the husband and wife had, by their actions, abandoned their
community property agreement. In doing so, the court applied
only one of the possible methods of analysis that it could have
used. Abandonment is, in a sense, a form of rescission. It
occurs when the parties mutually decide they no longer intend
that their agreement be operative. Many courts have described
exactly how a rescission (or an abandonment) can be accom-
plished.3' In each case, the court makes the rescission determi-
nation at the end of the term of the agreement, which often
occurs at the end of the marriage. It is not a matter of contrac-
tual interpretation, but rather of contractual termination;
moreover, it has nothing whatsoever to do with the intent of
the parties when they executed the agreement (absent, of
course, a clause dealing with rescission or abandonment).
The Lyman court could have used another method of anal-
ysis. The court could have implied an omitted term in the par-
ties' agreement that would terminate the community property
agreement when the parties are living separate and apart in a
defunct marriage. Such a term should be implied in most com-
munity property agreements based on the likely intent of the
parties, the public policy of the state, and the efficient resolu-
tion of such disputes.
III. IMPLICATION OF OMITTED TERMS
The community property agreement is a statutorily
authorized contract that allows husband and wife to dispose of
community property upon the death of either.32 The analysis
of the agreement must, therefore, derive essentially from con-
tract principles. One of those principles, the implication of an
omitted term, has direct application to the situation of a couple
that is permanently separated.
Parties to a contract generally form expectations with
respect to only a limited number of situations. Of those expec-
tations, the parties usually reduce only a portion to writing.
The terms most likely to be included in the contract are those
31. In re Estate of Wittman, 58 Wash. 2d 841, 365 P.2d 17 (1961); In re Estate of
Brown, 29 Wash. 2d 20, 185 P.2d 125 (1947); Monroe v. Fetzer, 56 Wash. 2d 39, 350 P.2d
1012 (1960); Mumm v. Mumm, 63 Wash. 2d 349, 387 P.2d 547 (1963). However, the
Lyman court did not consider the possibility that once the parties had permanently
separated, they had abandoned the marriage and thus, had also abandoned their
marriage-based agreements. In contrast, once the parties have permanently separated,
their property acquisitions are separate under WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.140 (1972).
32. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.120; see supra notes 1-7.
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that describe performance in the normal course of events.
Generally, non-performance items--those items that do not
describe directly the obligations of each party under the con-
tract-might affect the parties' ability to perform but would
only be included if foreseeable and desirable. In addition,
terms may be omitted because they were unforeseen (the par-
ties overlooked the obvious) or unforeseeable (the situation
was impossible to anticipate). Terms may be omitted because
the situations to which the terms might pertain, while fore-
seen, were either unlikely to arise during the term of the
agreement or were not discussed during the negotiation pro-
cess because to do so would have been indelicate, counter pro-
ductive, or both.
Before the court can begin to consider whether an implied
term is appropriate, it must interpret the existing terms of the
contract to determine if any of them apply or are intended to
apply to the situation. Only if there are no applicable terms
does the court proceed to the question of implication. By defi-
nition, if existing terms cannot be interpreted to apply to the
situation under consideration, then the only way the contract
has any application to the case at hand is by implying a new
and separate term.33
A court may base implication of terms to an agreement on
expectations that are subjective (the actual, shared, common
expectation of both parties), or that are objective (what most
parties would reasonably expect). 4 To determine the shared
expectations, the courts have used various indicators, such as
the provisions the parties made for related cases, the course of
performance after the contract has become operative, the gen-
eral course of dealing, and the negotiations leading up to the
contract (subject of course to the parol evidence rule and any
other legal limitations). 5 If the court chooses to rely on the
objective expectations, it is usually examining what the parties
would (or should) have wanted based upon a concept of reason-
ableness and basic principles of fairness and justice,-that is
to say, a term that "comports with community standards of
33. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 204 (1979); A. CoRBIN, CORBIN ON
CONTRAcTS, § 561 (1960); FARNSWORTH, CONTRAcTS, § 7.16 at 520 (1982); Farnsworth,
Disputes Over Omission in Contracts, 68 COL. L. REV. 860, 881 (1968).
34. FARNSWORTH, CONTRAcTs, supra note 33, § 7.16 at 523.
35. Id.; Speidel, Restatement Second. Omitted Terms and Contract Method, 67
CoRNE. L. REv. 785, 799 (1982).
36. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS, supra note 33, § 7.16 at 524.
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fairness and policy."'  "Fairness" has been described primarily
as avoiding economic servility; but the concept also includes
convenience, the need to discourage litigation, and the socially
and economically desirable placement of risk.-
An implication based on objective expectations is clearly
the most common and has gone far beyond implying the actual
expectations in fact of the parties. It has become, in essence, a
rule of law. First, courts imply an omitted term to accommo-
date the interests and intentions of most people involved in the
situation under consideration. Second, from the standpoint of
efficient resolution, if most people would desire such a term,
then implying it as a matter of course eliminates the costs of
negotiation and drafting. Thereafter, only those few people
who do not desire the implied result will be required to draft
out of the application of the implied term.39
IV. IMPLICATION OF A TERM OF TERMINATION IN THE
COMMUNITY PROPERTY AGREEMENT
Whether courts imply a term that terminates the usual
community property agreement upon permanent separation
will depend more upon the courts' and the legislature's analy-
sis of public policy considerations and the treatment of related
questions than on the express intentions of the parties. There
is little if any basis for implication of the actual (subjective)
expectations of the parties. While a permanent separation is a
clearly foreseeable event, it is very seldom addressed. More-
over, since most off-the-shelf agreements do not address termi-
nation at all, the courts lack analogous express expectations on
which they can base their implications.
This is one of those classic situations in which we simply
cannot determine why the parties failed to account for the pos-
37. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 204, Comment d (1979); Speidel,
supra note 35, at 803.
38. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS, supra note 33, § 7.16 at 524-525; Farnsworth,
Disputes Over Omission in Contracts, supra note 33, at 877-879.
39. It is costly to acquire relevant information, and to negotiate and to draft
contracts providing for every possible contingency. Moreover, one function of contract
law is to reduce that complexity and attendant costs by providing terms for the gaps in
the contracts that were too costly to negotiate and provide for in the contract itself.
Generally these terms will reflect what the parties (or most parties) would have done
had they been able to draft without cost. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, § 4.1
at 82-83 (3rd ed. 1986); POLINsKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS, at 27
(2nd ed. 1989).
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sibility of permanent separation.40 They may have felt that the
law would account for it through the process of dissolution, or
in other words, that the law of dissolution would supply the
necessary term. This assumes, of course, that the parties per-
ceived permanent separation as a fleeting state of limbo that is
subsumed immediately into the dissolution process. In many
cases, this could not be further from the truth. Separation may
well turn out to be a long, tedious, and contentious state all its
own, with legal and emotional attributes that are separate
from either the state of marriage or the state of dissolution.4
It also may be that the parties felt that the law relating to sep-
aration prior to dissolution would supply the term. There is
some basis for this belief in the law relating to living separate
and apart,' assuming the parties were familiar with that
concept.
However, in many cases, the parties have only a genera-
lized assumption that the law will provide the necessary terms
in certain situations. As noted earlier, this assumption is and
should be true in those cases in which the general intention of
the population is clear. As is discussed below, the general
intention and likely understanding of the population in the
case of a permanent separation would appear to be that the
agreement terminates upon permanent separation.
Even if the parties had foreseen the separation, they may
have felt that separation was an event so unlikely to arise in
their case that it would be inefficient and counterproductive to
reduce their expectation to writing. Clearly not all expecta-
tions in remote contingencies are reduced to writing. Or, there
is the possibility that, while separation was foreseen and recog-
nized as a possibility, both parties found it indelicate and,
therefore, inappropriate to raise within the confines of an
otherwise happy, marital relationship. But even if it is, at best,
unclear whether the parties had any expectations regarding a
given situation, the courts will often imply a term based upon
the hypothetically projected expectations of reasonable individ-
uals in the same situation.43
40. Fainsworth, Disputes Over Omission in Contracts, supra note 33, at 868-873.
41. See discussion of the law of living separate and apart, supra notes 10-19 and
accompanying text, infra notes 44-55 and accompanying text.
42. Id.
43. This is part of the court's "fairness analysis," which has been a part of the
implication process, but which also comes perilously close to writing the contract for
the parties after the fact with no evidence of expectations or understandings
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To the extent that the parties expected the law to provide
omitted terms, developing the set of hypothetical expectations
also fulfills the parties' expectations, since all are based upon
the same public policy principles. Therefore, supplying, as
implied, a term that the parties would have wanted had they
considered the matter, or a term that they assumed the law
would provide, must rely on the relevant public policy and an
efficient approach to the resolution of such disputes.
Implication of a term that would terminate the community
property agreement upon permanent separation has support
both in the general policy relating to property acquisitions
after a permanent separation and in the efficient resolution of
disputes. In other words, most parties would want the courts
to imply such a term and by doing so, the courts will further
the attitude of the law in general pertaining to property acqui-
sitions after permanent separation.
The general philosophy of the law of acquisitions during
that separation provides the most likely basis for implication of
terms for a community property agreement in the case of per-
manent separation.
V. IMPLICATION OF TERMS BASED UPON THE PRINCIPLES OF
PERMANENT SEPARATION
The principles for property acquisition during a permanent
separation appear directly analogous to the application of a
community property agreement during a permanent separa-
tion.44 As in the typical community property agreement, most
parties, upon entering into marriage, fail to provide for or
agree on the ownership of assets acquired during a permanent
separation.45 Since the marriage is not yet dissolved, however,
the property acquired remains characterized as community
under normal community property principles.' However, stat-
utory and case law provide an express exception for the parties
whatsoever. As discussed above, it becomes more like a rule of law that coincides with
the expectations-or likely expectations--of most people in the same situation. See
Farnsworth, Disputes Over Omission in Contracts, supra note 33, at 877-879; Speidel,
supra note 35, at 803.
44. For a discussion of the status of living "separate and apart," see supra notes 10-
19 and accompanying text.
45. Here, too, it is impossible to tell whether the parties' failure to provide for the
possibility of permanent separation was attributable to an oversight or was simply
ignored as unlikely to occur or indelicate to raise.
46. WASH. REv. CODE § 26.16.030 (1986); see Yesler v. Hochstettler, 4 Wash. 349, 30
P. 398 (1986).
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in this situation.47
Originally, Wash. Rev. Code § 26.16.140 provided that the
earnings of the wife would be her separate property while liv-
ing "separate from her husband."" One possible theory for
such an exception is that the wife was in need of protection
and should not be responsible in any way for the support of
her (possibly wayward) husband after they had permanently
separated. While this is conjecture, it is certainly plausible
given the time of the statute's adoption-1881--and its applica-
tion to wives only. However, this principle was extended to
acquisitions by husbands as well in the holding of Togliatti v.
Robinson49 In Togliatti, the court imposed a requirement that,
for purposes of acquisitions made while permanently sepa-
rated, the parties must maintain a "community" as well as a
"marital" relationship.' The premise of most community
property law is that the marriage is a type of joint venture5l
and that the products of that venture should be shared equally.
There is an implication within that premise that the law will
not scrutinize the activities of each individual spouse. Rather,
the law will presume that the spouses' activities, by definition,
contribute to the community and result in a community owner-
ship of the products.
Reasoning that the joint venture aspect of the relationship
ceases to exist upon permanent separation, the court in Tog-
liatti held that acquisitions by the husband during the defunct
marriage would be separate property. At this point, there
could be no presumption of contributions by both and, as a
result, no joint ownership.52 In addition, the court recognized
that, while there was no "formal agreement," the parties had
47. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.140 (1986); Togliatti v. Robertson, 29 Wash. 2d 844,
190 P.2d 575 (1948).
48. WAH. REV. CODE § 26.16.140 (1986) provided as follows:
The earnings and accumulations of the wife and of her minor children living
with her, or in her custody while she is living separate from her husband, are
the separate property of the wife.
The original version of the statute, which is quoted above, was amended in 1972. It
now applies to acquisitions by either the husband or the wife. For the text of the
amended version of the statute, see infra note 54.
49. 29 Wash. 2d 844, 190 P.2d 575.
50. Id. at 852, 190 P.2d at 578-79; Cross, supra note 1, at 33.
51. Since the community is unique and not a true legal entity, most commentators
avoid comparisons to partnerships, joint tenancies and joint ventures, and the like,
even if the attributes are quite similar. "Joint venture" is used here in its broadest
descriptive sense and is not meant at all to suggest a true legal joint venture.
52. Togliatti, 29 Wash. 2d 844, 852, 190 P.2d 575, 579 (1948).
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demonstrated, by their conduct, that acquisitions during this
period were the separate property of the acquirer.5 While this
approaches an implication of a term to the marriage contract,
it could also be viewed as either a new agreement or a modifi-
cation of the existing agreement. In any case, policy considera-
tions and the likely intent of parties make reasonably clear
that permanent separation does and should alter the legal
structure of the community for purposes of property
acquisition.
The policies behind the original RCW 26.16.140 and the
Togliatti decision provided the impetus for a revised Wash.
Rev. Code § 26.16.140. In 1972, the legislature extended the
rule pertaining to property acquisitions while living separate
and apart to both husband and wife.54 It is not clear whether
all aspects of prior case law, especially those relating to hus-
bands, would be incorporated; however, they are certainly
likely to be incorporated to the extent that they do not conflict
with the express terms of the statute.5
The policy behind Wash. Rev. Code § 26.16.140 and the
Togliatti decision could also support the implication of a term
in the community property agreement that terminates the
agreement upon permanent separation. The failure of the
joint venture aspect of the marital relationship eliminates a
crucial element necessary for characterizing property acquisi-
tions as community.5 The concept of joint venture is certainly
a part of the underpinning and a prerequisite for the commu-
nity property agreement as well.5 7 Furthermore, the joint ven-
ture is significant evidence of what the reasonable expectations
of the parties would be. The policy behind Wash. Rev. Code
§ 26.16.140 is in part based upon the legislature's perception of
53. Id.
54. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.140 (1972), which reads:
When a husband and wife are living separate and apart, their respective
earnings and accumulations shall be the separate property of each. The
earnings and accumulations of minor children shall be the separate property
of the spouse who has their custody or, if no custody award has been made,
then the separate property of the spouse with whom said children are living.
55. Cross, Equality For Spouses In Washington Community Property Law: 1972
Statutory Changes, 48 WAsH. L. REv. 527, 531 (1973).
56. See supra notes 51-52, and accompanying text.
57. It is the underpinning and a prerequisite for the statutory element of those
community property agreements under WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.120 (1986), which are
only available to "the husband and wife" who must "jointly" enter the agreement.
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what the parties would have wanted upon failure of the joint
venture.
At the time spouses execute a community property agree-
ment (whether it applies to existing property, future acquisi-
tions, or at-death distribution), it is premised to a large extent
upon the existence of the underlying joint venture aspect of
their marriage. It is certainly possible that the parties could
agree to the conversion of all separate property to community
property and the distribution of community property to the
survivor upon the death of the first to die while they are per-
manently separated, but it is very unlikely that they would do
so. It would seem almost certain that the provisions in the
agreement dealing with property conversions and distributions
are dependent upon an ongoing marriage, a relationship in
which the product of each person's efforts is shared equally.
As has been discussed above, that is simply not the case when
there has been a permanent separation. Therefore, it seems
consistent to imply a term which terminates the agreement
once one of the primary bases for the agreement is lost.
VI. INTER VIVOs V& AT-DEATH PRovISION& THE IMPACT OF
IMPLIED TERMS
The implication of a term terminating the community
property agreement upon permanent separation could also
help in carrying out the policy of the defunct marriage stat-
ute.' If the agreement did not have a term (implied or
express) that terminated the contract upon permanent separa-
tion, it is likely that Wash. Rev. Code § 26.16.140 would charac-
terize each spouse's earnings as separate. At the same time, if
still in effect, the inter-vivos conversion clause in the commu-
nity property agreement could then operate to re-convert that
separate property into community property and, in effect,
undermine the policy of the statute.59 The possibility of recon-
version in spite of the intent of Wash. Rev. Code § 26.16.140
further argues for an implied term of termination upon perma-
58. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.140 (1986).
59. Most common community property agreements refer to current holdings,
future acquisitions, and at-death distribution (which is authorized by WASH. REV. CODE
§ 26.16.120 (1986) and requires formality). In most cases, the second clause, which
relates to future acquisitions, converts separate property acquisitions to community.
To the extent that earnings during a defunct marriage are separate, such a clause
could re-convert them to community after WASH. REv. CODE § 26.16.140 (1986)
converted them to separate.
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nent separation, especially with respect to the inter-vivos con-
version clause.
Whether the policy with respect to this possible reconver-
sion might differ when dealing with the inter-vivos conversion
clause as compared to the the statutory at-death clause may be
debated. The inter-vivos clause, if it operates as an immediate
conversion from separate to community,60 can undermine the
policy behind the defunct marriage statute (Wash. Rev. Code
§ 26.16.140); however, if the at-death clause continues
unterminated, it has little or no perceptible impact on the
defunct marriage statute and the policy behind it. For
instance, without the inter-vivos conversion clause (which
would reconvert defunct marriage-mandated separate property
back to community), the at-death clause would only dispose of
community property. By definition, since all post-separation
property acquired is separate, the only property that could be
community had to have been acquired prior to the separation.
Of course, if there were an inter-vivos conversion clause still
operable, then the at-death clause would distribute post-sepa-
ration separate property as converted community property.
Thus, such a distribution would further undermine the policy
behind Wash. Rev. Code § 26.16.140.
The only established policy on this question comes from
the execution of wills statute,6 ' and even more specifically,
from the post-testamentary divorce statute.6 2 That statute
expressly revokes the portions of a will in favor of a former
spouse following a divorce. Until the divorce is final, the will
remains operative and effective regardless of the separated sta-
tus of the parties (permanent or otherwise). This dependence
on final dissolution is likely based in part on the legislature's
difficulty in determining, as an evidentiary matter, when the
status of the parties has actually reached a permanent and
divorce-like position.
While it is very likely, if not uniformly so, that the parties
would want to revoke a will in favor of their former spouse if
the divorce were final, the legislature may feel less certain
about the parties' likely intent in those intermediate steps
prior to final divorce. However, the same legislature has recog-
60. See supra notes 1-7 and accompanying text for a discussion of the "first
prong."
61. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.12.020 (1987).
62. WAH. REv. CODE § 11.12.050.
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nized the termination of the relationship short of divorce in
the defunct marriage statute (as it relates to community prop-
erty acquisitions after permanent separation).' In addition,
the legislature has provided (with judicial interpretation) a
reasonably effective means for identifying when a defunct
marriage has finally occurred."
The other possible basis for the legislature limiting will
revocation to final divorce may be the ability of each party,
unilaterally, to revoke his or her will prior to divorce (during
the intermediate stages of separation) and to write a new will
if they so desire. That possibility does not exist for the com-
munity property agreement since it is a bilateral contract and
may only be rescinded by mutual agreement.65 That difference
alone may be enough to decide that the policies underlying the
post-testamentary divorce statute66 are not sufficiently analo-
gous to control in the otherwise similar community property
agreement situation.
In summary, while the policy behind the post-divorce stat-
ute might indicate that only divorce should amount to a revo-
cation/termination, there may be reasons that the legislature
limited revocation to divorce that would not necessarily apply
to the implication of a term of termination in community prop-
erty agreements.
63. See supra notes 10-19, 44-55 and accompanying text.
64. Oil Heat Co. of Port Angeles v. Sweeney, 26 Wash. App. 351, 613 P.2d 169
(1980) (infrequent appearances at home were not enough to declare the marriage
defunct); Peters v. Skalman, 27 Wash. App. 247, 617 P.2d 448 (1980); In re Estate of
Nikiporez, 19 Wash. App. 231, 574 P.2d 1204, rev. denied, 90 Wash. 2d 1013 (1978); In re
Estate of Osicka, 1 Wash. App. 277, 461 P.2d 585 (1969); Rustad v. Rustad, 61 Wash. 2d
176, 377 P.2d 414 (1963) (no renunciation of marriage despite commitment of wife to an
out-of-state mental institution); Makeig v. United Security Bank and Trust Co., 112
Cal. App. 138, 296 P. 673 (1931) (living together for six weeks out of a 14-1/2 year
marriage was not determinative of a permanent separation). See supra notes 10-19 and
accompanying text. This is not intended as a brief for the extension of the post-
testamentary divorce statute to permanent separation (although it could be argued at a
later date). Rather, it is an attempt to seek out any analogous policies that may bear
on the implication of a term which terminates the at-death clause.
65. In re Estate of Ford, 31 Wash. App. 136, 639 P.2d 848 (1982); In re Estate of
Lyman, 7 Wash. App. 945, 503 P.2d 1127 (1972), aff'd 82 Wash. 2d 693, 512 P.2d 1093
(1973) (adopting opinion of Court of Appeals); In re Estate of Wittman, 58 Wash. 2d
841, 365 P.2d 17 (1961). WAsH. REV. CODE § 26.16.120 (1986) states that recission must
be done in the same manner as the execution. The above cases as well as others, have
interpreted this statutory language to include less formal means of recission if the
parties clearly demonstrate their mutual intent to rescind. However, the intent must
in fact be mutual.
66. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.12.050 (1987).
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VII. ESTATE OF LYMAN REvIsITED: CONCLUSION
In Lyman, the court found that filing for dissolution, pos-
sible separation, and the execution of wills inconsistent with
an existing community property agreement did not amount to
an abandonment.6 7 Thus, the parties' community property
agreement remained in effect. The court did not discuss the
possibility that the permanent separation of the parties might
constitute an abandonment of the marriage, and, therefore, a
concomitant abandonment of the marriage-dependent agree-
ments like the community property agreement." Nor did the
court discuss the other possible approach: implication of a
term in the agreement which, in effect, terminates the agree-
ment upon permanent separation ("living separate and apart"
in a defunct marriage).
The implication of a term of termination in a community
property agreement is based upon the general policy of treat-
ing the parties as separate units, as opposed to a community
unit, once the parties have permanently separated. Since we
already treat the parties as separate units for property acquisi-
tion purposes during a permanent separation, a consistent pol-
icy would also imply a term for them that would terminate
such a primary property-distributive document like the com-
munity property agreement. Such an implied term is also con-
sistent with the law's sense of efficient resolution of disputes
and of providing clear legal rules in those areas where the par-
ties' intent is sufficiently certain, in order to avoid the high
costs of drafting and negotiation absent such objectively
implied terms.
67. 7 Wash. App. 945, 503 P.2d 1127.
68. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.120 (1986); Cross, supra note 1, at 104.
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